Device-independent entanglement-based Bennett 1992 protocol by Lucamarini, Marco et al.
Device-independent entanglement-based Bennett 1992 protocol
Marco Lucamarini1, Giuseppe Vallone2,3, Ilaria Gianani2, Paolo Mataloni2,5, and Giovanni Di Giuseppe1,4
1Scuola di Scienze e Tecnologie, Divisione di Fisica, I-62032 Camerino (MC), Italy
2Dipartimento di Fisica, Universita` Sapienza di Roma, I-00185 Roma, Italy
3Department of Information Engineering, University of Padova, I-35131 Padova, Italy
4 CriptoCam s.r.l., Via Madonna delle Carceri 9, I-62032 Camerino (MC), Italy and
5Istituto Nazionale di Ottica, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (INO-CNR), L.go E. Fermi 6, I-50125 Firenze, Italy
In this paper we set forth a novel connection between the Bennett 1992 protocol and a Bell inequal-
ity. This allows us to extend the usual prepare-and-measure protocol to its entanglement-based
formulation. We exploit a recent result in the framework of device-independent quantum key distri-
bution to provide a simple, model-independent, security proof for the new protocol. The minimum
efficiency required for a practical implementation of the scheme is the lowest reported to date.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.65.Ud
I. INTRODUCTION
On 1992 Charles Bennett introduced his famous
minimal-state protocol for Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD), named after him “B92” [1]. It makes use of two
nonorthogonal quantum states to convey one bit of in-
formation from a transmitting user (Alice) to a receiving
user (Bob).
The single-photon B92 protocol was proven uncondi-
tional secure in [2, 3]. Its main problem is the unam-
biguous state discrimination (USD) [4] attack, initially
discussed in [1] and later on analyzed in [3], which dra-
matically reduces its tolerance to the losses of the com-
munication channel and, by consequence, its applicability
to a practical scenario. In this respect, a novel version of
the single-photon B92 protocol, robust against the USD
attack, has been recently introduced in [5]. It exploits
two additional states in Alice’s preparation, called “un-
informative states”, to let the users detect a USD attack.
For this reason it was called “us-B92” [5].
At variance with the more popular BB84 protocol [6],
the B92 does not allow for an entanglement-based real-
ization and can only be implemented in a prepare-and-
measure (PM) configuration. This means that in order
to guarantee its unconditional security it is necessary to
enclose the source of photons in Alice’s territory, well
shielded against a malicious presence (Eve) eavesdrop-
ping on the quantum channel. So, for instance, it is not
possible to place the light source in the middle of Alice
and Bob in order to increase the maximum working dis-
tance [7, 8] of a B92-based QKD session. The us-B92
protocol follows the same fate as the B92, and is only PM
as well. However we realized that it admits a straight-
forward extension to a description and implementation
which are based on the entanglement, called ”ent-B92”
henceforth.
Several security proofs of B92 rely on entanglement
distillation. However the entanglement is used only as a
mathematical tool to demonstrate security, but the phys-
ical realization was always based on PM scheme. Here we
propose to use the entanglement as the physical resource
to realize the cryptographic protocol. In this case it is
possible to implement the protocol with the entanglement
source placed in an untrusted location, between Alice and
Bob. The security proofs of the standard B92 [2, 5] and
of the us-B92 [5] are valid only assuming that the entan-
gled source is shielded in Alice side. In our protocol even
if the entanglement source is under Eve’s control, we will
demonstrate that it is possible to prove its security by
connecting it with a particular form of Bell inequality [9],
put forward for the first time by Clauser and Horne in
1974 [10] and later on adapted to non-maximally entan-
gled states by Eberhard [11]. This connection, besides
giving a new physical insight into a long-standing proto-
col like the B92, allows us to provide a simple security
proof for the new protocol, which exploits a recent work
by Masanes et al. [12] in the frame of device-independent
(DI) QKD.
Hence, the ent-B92 is proven u e regardless of the
particular implementation of the protocol. The secu-
rity proof employed is totally different from the stan-
dard one [2, 3], which is based on the approach de-
scribed in [13, 14]. Notwithstanding, the obtained se-
curity threshold is remarkably close to the one given in
the literature, thus confirming the B92 state of the art.
In addition to this, we managed to exploit the novel pro-
tocol and its security proof to decrease considerably the
minimum detection efficiency for a possible realization of
a DI-QKD, from 92.4% reported in [15] to 75% of our
approach.
II. ENT-B92 PROTOCOL
Here we introduce the entanglement-based ent-B92
protocol that can be reduced to the B92 [1] or us-B92 [5]
protocols. Let’s suppose that Alice and Bob share the
following non-maximally entangled state:
|Φ〉AB =(|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B)/
√
2
=β|0x〉A|0x〉B + α|1x〉A|1x〉B ,
(1)
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2where
|ϕj〉 = β|0x〉+ (−1)jα|1x〉, (2)
{|0z〉 , |1z〉} ({|0x〉 , |1x〉}) are the eigenstates of the Z (X)
basis with |jx〉 = [|0z〉 + (−1)j |1z〉]/
√
2, β = cos θ2 , α =
sin θ2 and θ ∈ (0, pi/2). The state |Φ〉AB has been used
in [16] and [11] to propose novel tests of local realism
and is routinely implemented in laboratory [17–20].
If Alice measures along the Z basis, she will project
Bob’s state in either |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉, with equal probabilities.
This was at the basis of the B92 unconditional security
proof given in Ref. [2]. However, it was accompanied by
the further assumption that the source of the entangled
photons must be placed in Alice’s secure location, hence
unreachable to Eve. This assumption is very reasonable if
one is interested to use a prepare-and-measure (PM) pro-
tocol. When the actual protocol is entanglement-based,
such an assumption should be avoided. Here we show
that the protocol is still secure even when the light source
is placed midway between the users. This ent-B92 scheme
can be seen as the entanglement version of the PM B92
scheme [1] in which Alice prepares and sends to Bob with
equal probability the states |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉. The bit encoded
by Alice is j = 0 or j = 1 depending on the |ϕj〉 state
received by Bob. The density matrix ρB held by Bob (or
prepared by Alice in the PM scheme) can be written as:
ρB =
|ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|+ |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|
2
= β2|0x〉〈0x|+α2|1x〉〈1x|. (3)
To decode the information, Bob measures the incoming
states in the basis Bk = {|ϕk〉, |ϕk〉}, k = {0, 1} where
|ϕk〉 = α|0x〉 − (−1)kβ|1x〉. Upon obtaining the state
|ϕk〉, Bob decodes Alice’s bit as j = k ⊕ 1 (the symbol
“⊕” means “addition modulo 2”) and labels the result
as conclusive; on the contrary, upon obtaining the state
|ϕk〉, Bob is not able to decode Alice’s bit deterministi-
cally, and simply labels the result as inconclusive.
The same entangled state can be also used to perform
the so called us-B92 [5], where, with probability 1−p, ev-
erything goes as in the standard B92; on the other hand,
with probability p  1, Alice prepares two additional,
uninformative, states, which are chosen as follows:
|us1〉 = |0x〉 ; |us2〉 = |1x〉. (4)
In particular, the states |0x〉 and |1x〉 are prepared with
probabilities p×β2 and p×α2 respectively. This is neces-
sary to assure that Eve cannot discriminate between the
density matrix pertaining to the signal states or to the
uninformative states Eq. (3). If Alice measures along the
X basis the entangled state (1), she will project Bob’s
state in either |0x〉, with probability β2, or |1x〉, with
probability α2 , thus preparing the uninformative states
of the us-B92 protocol, Eq. (4), with the correct prob-
abilities. So, the ent-B92 reduces to the us-B92 if one
considers that the results from Alice’s Z basis measure-
ments are used as bits of the final secret key, while those
from the X basis measurements are used to perform a
test against the USD attack, as in the us-B92. Bob’s
measurement remains the same as in the standard B92.
However, the presence of the uninformative states allow
the users to detect a possible USD attack [5].
To prove the security of the ent-B92 we follow the ap-
proach of device independent (DI) security proof [12], by
establishing a connection between the ent-B92 protocol
and a particular Bell inequality.
Let us write the following Bell inequality, which was
first introduced by Clauser and Horne [10] (“CH inequal-
ity” for short):
SCH = P (a1, b1) + P (a0, b1) + P (a1, b0)
−P (a0, b0)− P (a1)− P (b1) ≤ 0. (5)
Here P (ai, bj) is the joint probability that Alice detects
the state |ai〉 and Bob detects the state |bi〉, while P (a1)
and P (b1) are the probabilities that Alice and Bob re-
spectively measure |a1〉 and |b1〉, regardless of what is
measured by the other user. This takes into account also
those instances in which one of the users receives a vac-
uum count. For instance, the term P (a1) includes the
probability P (a1, bv) that Alice measures the state |a1〉
and Bob measures a vacuum. If both Alice and Bob de-
tect a vacuum count, the event doesn’t contribute to the
CH inequality. Local realism is verified until the above
inequality is true. On the contrary, quantum mechanics
is expected to violate such an inequality in some range
of values.
The goal is usually to maximize the CH violation, but,
in this paper, our first aim is to connect the violation
of a Bell inequality to the ent-B92 protocol. It is then
natural to choose the states |ai〉 and |bj〉 among the ent-
B92 states. We select for Alice the following states:
|a0〉 = |0z〉 , |a1〉 = |1x〉, (6)
while we choose for Bob:
|b0〉 = |ϕ0〉 , |b1〉 = |ϕ1〉. (7)
Using these states we are able to calculate the different
probabilities appearing in Eq. (5) and see for which spe-
cific values of θ the CH inequality is violated. After some
algebra, the value of SCH as a function of θ is found to
be:
SCH(θ) =
1
2
cos θ(1− cos θ). (8)
This quantity is plotted in Fig. 1 with a solid line. It is
positive for all values of θ in the open interval (0, pi/2),
i.e. it violates the Bell inequality for the same interval
of θ in which the ent-B92 protocol is defined. Only the
extremal points θ = 0 and θ = pi/2 are excluded. The
maximum violation occurs at θmax = pi/3, corresponding
to SCH = 1/8. We also plot the maximum violation
SmaxCH (θ) that can be obtained with generic measurements
on |Φ〉AB [21].
3θ
SCH
SmaxCH
0 pi/4 pi/3 pi/2
0
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FIG. 1. Plot of SCH (solid line) as function of θ. We also
plot with dashed line the maximum violation achievable with
the non-maximally entangled state (1), namely SmaxCH (θ) =
1
2
(
√
sin2 θ + 1− 1). The maximum violation can be obtained
if Alice measure along the states (6), and Bob along the new
states |b′0〉 = |ϕ′0〉, |b′1〉 = |ϕ′1〉, where |ϕ′0〉 and |ϕ′1〉 are chosen
like in Eq. (2) but with an angle θ′ satisfying tan θ′ = sin θ.
We notice that the choice |a1〉 = |1x〉, which is not
present in the traditional B92 protocol and is present in
the us-B92 protocol only for detecting the USD attack,
here derives directly from the Bell inequality. In fact,
after choosing |a0〉, |b0〉 and |b1〉 as in the B92 protocol,
(6) and (7), the choice of |a1〉 = |1x〉 is the one which
maximizes the violation of the CH inequality.
III. SECURITY PROOF OF THE ent-B92
In this section we exploit a recent work by
Masanes et al. [12] to demonstrate the unconditional se-
curity of the newly introduced ent-B92 protocol. Since
the security proof is based on the measured correlations,
the security is assured even if the entanglement source is
under the Eve’s control. Moreover, since in Ref. [12] a
bound for the min entropy is found, the security obtained
for the ent-B92 protocol is composable [40, 42].
In [12] it is explicitly given the final secure gain [22]
R of a QKD protocol which uses a Bell inequality in the
form of a CHSH inequality [23] to guarantee the overall
security of the transmission. The length r = nconc×R of
the secret key obtained by processing the raw key with
an error-correcting protocol and a two-universal random
function is, up to terms of order
√
nconc, lower bounded
by Hmin(A|E) − Npub, where Hmin(A|E) is the min-
entropy of Alice’s outcomes conditioned on Eves infor-
mation on the joined Alice-Eve state, and Npub is the
number of bits published by Alice in the error-correcting
phase. The length of the public message necessary for
correcting Bobs errors is Npub = nconc × H(a|b), up to
terms of order
√
nconc. From the violation of the CHSH
inequality, Masanes et al. in [12] showed that the min
entropy is bounded and obtained the following bound on
the secure gain:
R ≥ − log2
(
1
2
+
1
2
√
2− S
2
CHSH
4
)
−H(a|b) (9)
where
SCHSH = 〈A1B1〉+ 〈A0B1〉+ 〈A1B0〉 − 〈A0B0〉. (10)
The correlation term are 〈AiBj〉 = P (ai, bj)+P (ai, bj)−
P (ai, bj)−P (ai, bj) and a¯i (b¯j) is the state orthogonal to
|ai〉 (|bj〉). The term containing the quantity SCHSH is
the one corresponding to the phase-error rate of the pro-
tocol [14]. It takes into account how much privacy ampli-
fication [24] should be performed by the users to remove
any residual information from Eve’s hands. The term
H(a|b) is related to the error correction procedure [25],
amounting to h(Q), with h the binary entropy [26] and
Q the QBER (quantum bit error rate) measured on the
quantum channel.
The bit error rate for the ent-B92 is a measurable quan-
tity of the protocol and doesn’t represent any problem.
It come out from the number of errors nerr, found by the
users during the error correction procedure, divided by
the number of conclusive events, ncon. The phase error
rate is given by a lower bound on Eve’s information as a
function of the CHSH value. This is the main result of
Ref. [12] that we want to apply here. However, the re-
sults of [12] apply to the CHSH inequality and we have to
relate it to the CH. By using P (ai, bj)+P (ai, bj) = P (bj)
and P (ai, bj) + P (ai, bj) = P (ai) it is possible to show
that the generic correlation term 〈AiBj〉 of SCHSH can
be written as 4P (ai, bj) − 2P (ai) − 2P (bj) + 1. Note
that this relation holds even if the vacuum counts are
taken into account. In fact, in this case it suffices to
modify the correlation terms in order to consider the
losses. We use the rule of considering the vacuum counts
as a detection on the orthogonal states |ai〉 and |bj〉
(when the observable Ai and Bj are measured respec-
tively). In this way the correlation term can be written
as 〈AiBj〉 = P (ai, bj)+[P (ai, bj)+P (av, bj)+P (ai, bv)+
P (av, bv)]− [P (ai, bj)+P (av, bj)]− [P (ai, bj)+P (ai, bv)].
Since P (ai) = P (ai, bi)+P (ai, bi)+P (ai, bv) even in this
case we obtain 〈AiBj〉 = 4P (ai, bj)−2P (ai)−2P (bj)+1.
Starting from this relation it is straightforward to show
that the two inequalities are related by SCHSH = 4SCH+
2 and the secure gain becomes
R = 1− log2
(
1 +
√
1− 4SCH − 4SCH2
)
− h(nerr
ncon
).
(11)
We can notice that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between nonlocality and security: in fact, the above se-
cure gain is always negative when SCH < 0, i.e., when
the CH inequality is no more violated, and is positive
when SCH > 0, if nerr = 0. In analogy with the stan-
dard approach, in order to obtain the secure rate of the
ent-B92 protocol, we have to multiply the obtained gain
by the number of conclusive events collected by Alice and
Bob:
rent−B92 = ncon ×R. (12)
Let us remark that this last step just concerns the effi-
ciency of the protocol, not its security, which only de-
4pends on the gain R and on the estimation of the CHSH
value from the measured CH inequality.
A. Resistance to losses
Resistance to losses - The DI security proof adopted
for the ent-B92 offers the immense advantage of mak-
ing the protocol independent of the practical details of
the implementation: Alice and Bob could even purchase
their devices directly from Eve, because the violation of a
Bell inequality would certify the secrecy of the transmis-
sion in any case. On the other side, this certification is
based on a Bell test, which is hardly feasible with current
technology (see however the proposals in [27, 28] and the
high-efficiency detectors reported in [29, 30]). The most
difficult step is to close the detection loophole, which re-
quires a very low global loss rate, from the light source
to the detectors. The maximum tolerable loss rate or,
equivalently, the minimum global efficiency ηg required
to close the detection loophole, is a figure of merit of a
given protocol: the lower ηg, the more feasible the pro-
tocol. It is known that to close the detection loophole
ηg cannot be lower than 2/3 (67%), a result for the first
time found by Eberhard [11] by an inequality very sim-
ilar to our Eq. (5). Here we want to quantify ηg for the
ent-B92, so to study its resistance against the losses of
the communication when the channel noise is zero. Using
the ent-B92 states given in Eqs. (6), (7), it is not difficult
to see that the resulting CH inequality can be written in
terms of θ, ηA (Alice total efficiency) and ηB (Bob total
efficiency) as:
S′CH(θ) =
(
ηA − 1
2
)
ηB sin
2 θ − ηA sin2 θ
2
. (13)
Note that if ηA = ηB = 1 this quantity coincides
with that of Eq. (8). It is interesting to detail a few
particular cases related to this result: (I) if ηA = 1,
then S′′CH = ηB(sin
2 θ)/2 − sin2(θ/2) and local realism
can be violated for ηB > 1/2; (II) if ηB = 1, then
S′′CH = (ηA − 1/2) sin2 θ−ηA sin2(θ/2), and local realism
can be violated for ηA > 2/3; (III) if ηA = ηB = η, then
S′′CH = (η − 1/2) η sin2 θ − η sin2(θ/2), and local realism
can be violated for η > 3/4.
The above case (III) corresponds to a symmetric con-
figuration, i.e. when Alice and Bob efficiencies are equal.
In this case ηg = 3/4, which is higher than the expected
value 2/3, corresponding to Eberhard’s result [11]. This
is due to the fact that the ent-B92 states are fixed and
cannot be further optimized. However, even though not
optimal, this result is quite interesting. In fact, due to
the one-to-one correspondence between secure gain and
nonlocality, we can conclude that the ent-B92 provides
a positive, model-independent, secure gain if the users’
efficiencies are higher than 75%. This value can be com-
pared, e.g., with that of Ref. [15], where the minimum
efficiency required is 92.4%.
We can further improve on our result by exploiting
the above case (I), which refers to a non-symmetric con-
figuration (see also [31, 32]), and introducing an addi-
tional assumption. In concrete, we place the source of
the entangled state, Eq. (1), in Alice’s territory, shielded
against Eve’s intrusion. This is a standard assumption in
QKD, which holds for all PM protocols. So we are going
back to a PM configuration and consider the PM version
of the device-independent ent-B92 just introduced. This
new situation does not cover anymore the possibility that
Alice’s setup is provided by Eve, but still covers the pos-
sible, involuntary, calibration errors in Alice’s devices;
moreover it covers, of course, the possibility that Bob’s
setup is provided directly by Eve. This can be also under-
stood by considering that Alice devices are trusted, even
though this alternative view is slightly stronger than our
assumption, since we let a certain degree of untrustiness
in Alice devices, represented by the calibration errors.
Since Eve cannot modify the result of a Bell test by
acting on Alice’s setup, we can safely assume that Alice
efficiency is 100%, thus falling into the above case (I),
which entails that Bob’s efficiency can be as low as 50% in
order to provide a positive secure gain independent of the
implementation details. This result coincides with what
obtained in [33] by a different approach and resembles
an entanglement-steering scenario [34], where detectors
are asymmetrically treated by the users in the search of
an EPR-steering inequality violation [35].
B. Resistance to noise
In order to perform a fair comparison with the stan-
dard PM protocols, we place the entangled light source
very close to Alice station. Then we consider a depolariz-
ing channel acting on the state going from Alice to Bob,
as follows:
ρ→ ρ′ = (1− p)ρ+ p
3
(σxρσx + σyρσy + σzρσz), (14)
with σi the usual Pauli matrices. It is straightforward
to show that the quantity SCH is modified by the de-
polarizing channel as follows: S′CH = 1 − 4p3 SCH − 2p3 ,
where SCH is given by Eq. (5). By substituting S
′
CH
in Eq. (12) we obtain the secure rate of the ent-B92 as
a function of the depolarizing parameter p. The result,
normalized by the total number of events detected by the
users, is plotted in Fig. 2. In the same figure we also plot
the secure normalized rate R˜ pertaining to the PM B92
protocols, i.e. the standard B92 and the us-B92. In fact,
they both share the same resistance against a depolariz-
ing channel [36]. The ent-B92 rate remains positive up to
pent−B92max ' 0.0336, which is about the same value known
in the literature for PM-B92 (pPM−B92max = 0.034 [2]). In
obtaining these results, the optimal angle θ for the ent-
B92 is nearly constant regardless of the value of p; it
is 61.56◦ for p = 0.01, 62.65◦ for p = 0.02, 63.57◦ for
p = 0.03. These values of the optimal θ are quite close
50 0.01 0.02 0.03
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
p
R~
FIG. 2. Secure normalized rate pertaining to the DI
entanglement-based ent-B92 (solid line) and to PM B92 and
us-B92 (dashed line) as function of the depolarizing rate p
(see text). The maximum depolarizing rate tolerated by the
ent-B92 is pent−B92max ' 0.0336, nearly the same as PM-B92,
pPM−B92max = 0.034 [2].
to those corresponding to the optimal θ for the us-B92
(about 55◦) [5] and for the asymmetric feedback (about
60◦) [37]. It can be noted that none of the secure rates
reported in Fig. 2 starts from the value 1. This is due
to the presence of inconclusive counts in all the B92-like
protocols. Other DI protocols provide a better efficiency
and a higher resistance to noise [12, 38].
It is interesting to observe that if the users perform
generalized measurements thus obtaining an estimate for
the quantity SmaxCH , this does not improve the final se-
cure rate of the ent-B92. The problem is that in order
to estimate SmaxCH the user Bob has to measure along an
angle θ′ which is different from the angle θ characteriz-
ing the initial entangled state, Eq. (1). This increases the
error correction term h( nerrncon ) in Eq. (12), thus reducing
the overall rate. In fact we have verified that the maxi-
mum tolerated noise in this case amounts to p ' 0.0234,
obtained with an angle θ ' 75◦.
C. Resistance to USD attack
The security proof of the ent-B92 is DI and covers
all possible attacks performed by Eve, included the USD
attack, which typically represents the most dangerous
menace against B92-like protocols. In the simplest USD
attack [1] Eve performs the same measurement as Bob.
When she measures |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉 she sends |ϕ1〉 or |ϕ0〉 re-
spectively. When she measures |ϕ0〉 or |ϕ1〉, she doesn’t
send anything to Bob, making him detect a loss. She
thus performs the following POVM: Π1 =
1
2 |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|,
Π2 =
1
2 |ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|, Π3 = 12 |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|, Π4 = 12 |ϕ0〉〈ϕ0|. De-
pending on the measured Πi, she sends to Bob the corre-
sponding following states |χ1〉 ≡ |ϕ1〉, |χ2〉 ≡ |ϕ0〉, |χ3〉 =
|χ4〉 ≡ |vac〉, where |vac〉 is the vacuum state. If such
an attack is brought against the quantum communica-
tion, it alters the quantum state shared by Alice and
Bob, which is no more given by Eq. (1) but becomes:
ρ′ =
∑4
i=1 Trb
[
|Φ〉ab〈Φ|Πi
]
⊗|χi〉b〈χi|. Since the state ρ′
is separable it cannot violate any Bell inequality, included
the CH inequality, Eq. (5), thus letting the users detect
the attack. It is worth noticing that this simple argument
applies to any generic intercept-and-resend attack.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the present paper we have connected the long-
standing B92 protocol to a particular form of Bell in-
equality. This allowed us to provide a simple security
proof for a new entanglement-based B92-like protocol
which is independent of how the QKD apparatus is mod-
eled. In the proposed protocol, called ”ent-B92”, the
same quantum states can be used either to distill the
final key or to test the violation of a Bell inequality. To-
gether with the fact that only two measurement bases are
required in Alice and Bob sites, this represents a prac-
tical advantage respect to other device-independent pro-
tocols, which have to switch between different measure-
ment bases in order to distill secret bits or to perform
a Bell test [15, 39]. The gain and tolerance to noise of
the ent-B92 are lower than in other device-independent
protocols [12, 38], but both the figures can be improved
by extending to the new protocol the same techniques
available for the prepare-and-measure B92 [5]. Further-
more the minimum required efficiency to run the ent-B92
is 75% if the users’ efficiencies are assumed to be equal,
and 50% if the source of entangled states is enclosed in
Alice’s territory. For other protocols [15] a value of at
least 92.4% was necessary.
The ent-B92 protocol turns out to be a particular
case of an entanglement-distribution problem. It orig-
inates from a non-maximally entangled state which is
distributed to two distant users. As a matter of fact, this
kind of entanglement gives rise to a local non-symmetric
density matrix which can be exploited by the users to
efficiently stabilize the transmission channel without any
external communication [37]. This could represent an
important resource when entanglement has to be dis-
tributed from a satellite or on very long distances.
A test confirming the feasibility of the ent-B92 proto-
col can be experimentally performed with current tech-
nology. The non-maximally entangled state of Eq. (1)
can be produced in laboratory [17–20] and a proof of
principle experiment is on the way.
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